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of Social Norms
Oliver Hümbelin*
Abstract: This study estimates the prevalence of non-take-up of social assistance using 
 administrative data from the Canton of Bern.  Regional variation in non-take-up rates is then 
used to study the contextual effects of social norms with respect to welfare receipt legitimacy. 
Social norms are proxied with the degree of urbanity, language regions and communal voter 
shares of left- and right-wing parties.  Multiple regression analysis, extended by several ro-
bustness checks, suggests that social norms do indeed have an impact on take-up behavior.
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Nichtbezug von Sozialhilfe: Regionale Unterschiede und die Bedeutung von 
 sozialen Normen
Zusammenfassung: Diese Studie nimmt eine Schätzung der Nichtbezugsquote von Sozialhilfe 
anhand von Administrativdaten des Kantons Bern vor. Anhand der regionalen Unterschiede 
werden anschliessend die kontextuellen Auswirkungen sozialer Normen auf die Inanspruch-
nahme von Sozialhilfe untersucht. Soziale Normen werden mit dem Grad der Urbanität, 
Sprachregionen und kommunalen Wähleranteilen linker und rechter Parteien angenähert. 
Multiple Regressionsanalysen, die mit Robustheitsprüfungen erweitert wurden, deuten darauf 
hin, dass soziale Normen einen Einfluss auf das Bezugsverhalten haben.
Schlüsselwörter: Nichtbezug, Sozialhilfe, Schweiz, regionale Unterschiede, Einstellungen zum 
Wohlfahrtsstaat
Non-recours à l’aide sociale : différences régionales et importance des  
normes  sociales
Résumé : Cette étude propose une estimation de la prévalence du non-recours à l’aide sociale 
à partir de données administratives du canton de Berne. Les variations régionales du taux de 
non-recours sont ensuite utilisées pour étudier les effets contextuels de différentes normes 
sociales sur la légitimité à recourir à l’aide sociale. Les normes sociales sont approximées selon 
le degré d’urbanisation, les régions linguistiques et la part d’électeurs de gauche et de droite 
dans les partis locaux. Des analyses de régression multiples étendues avec plusieurs tests de 
robustesse suggèrent que les normes sociales ont effectivement un impact sur les comporte-
ments en matière de recours à l’aide sociale.
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1 Introduction1 
Most Western societies provide social assistance for households that lack the resources 
to maintain a minimum standard of living.  However, the redistributive effectiveness 
of such policies can be compromised if eligible recipients do not claim the benefits 
they are entitled to.  If non-take-up rates are high, it is questionable whether anti-
poverty schemes are designed adequately.  Several studies show, however, that non-
take-up is present within OECD countries (Hernanz et al. 2004), and within many 
EU Member States (Eurofond 2015).  Typically, non-take-up rates are higher in the 
case of means-tested social assistance programs, where estimates range from 20% to 
60%, compared to insurance-based benefits, where non-take-up rates range from 20% 
to 40% (Hernanz et al. 2004, 10).  In this context, the observatory on Non-Take 
Up of Social Rights and Public Services (Odenore 2012) concluded for France that 
in the year 2011, social benefits with an equivalent value of 5.3 billion EURO were 
not taken up by people who were theoretically entitled to do so, and non-take-up is 
a phenomenon that needs further attention (Warin 2016).  In  Switzerland too, the 
topic gained increased interest, as indicated by ongoing research projects (Bonvin 
et al. 2015; Lucas et al. 2015), and since 2015, by an annual regional seminar on 
the non-use of social rights and social benefits.2
One question of investigation is why people don’t take up the benefits they are 
entitled to.  An argument frequently used is that the expected benefits are too low in 
comparison to the transaction costs of applying for social assistance (Riphahn 2001). 
In line with this argument, Bruckmeier and Wiemers (2012) identify the degree of 
need and the expected duration of eligibility as important determinants of claiming 
social assistance.  Other authors argue that administrative errors and administrative 
hurdles lead to increased non-take-up rates (Currie 2004; Neuenschwander et al. 
2012; Van Oorschot 1991; Van Oorschot 1998; Van Oorschot 2002).  These can 
take the form of direct administrative effects, which occur when administrators 
wrongly decide to reject a claim, as well as indirect administrative effects, which arise 
from administrative arrangements that discourage eligible people from applying for 
benefits.  Furthermore, other studies emphasize the role of stigmatization (Kayser and 
Frick 2000; Moffitt 1983).  They argue that claiming benefits is prone to a stigma 
that induces social costs, which may deter potential recipients from claiming any 
benefits they are entitled to.  While Hernanz et al. (2004) consider psychological 
and social costs as one of the main determinants of the high levels of non-take-up 
1 The present study was conducted as part of the project Inequality of Income and Wealth in  Switzerland 
that was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundations.  Tax Data was kindly provided by 
the cantonal tax administration of Bern.  The author wishes to thank Ben Jann, Robert Fluder, 
Rudolf Farys, Renate Salzgeber and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper.  Further thanks go to the Social Security Research Group of the 
Bern University of Applied Sciences for inspiring discussions as part of an internal presentation 
of the research outline.
2 https://www.hesge.ch/hets/seminaire-regional-non-recours-aux-droits-et-prestations-sociales.
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for most welfare benefits, Daponte et al. (1999) argue against the high importance 
of stigma effects.  By doing a special survey with people below the poverty threshold 
that did not apply for the food stamp program in the US, they find that the lack of 
information explained non-take-up better than previously assumed stigmatization, 
which was rarely reported as a reason not to take up benefits.  It is, however, possible 
that results were influenced by the setting of the study itself, as it is reasonable that 
the information provided as part of the study reduced the previously present fear of 
stigmatization.  In a recent nationally-representative survey in the UK, Baumberg 
(2016) found that one quarter says a stigma-related reason would make them less 
likely to claim, which indicates that the fear of stigmatization is indeed considered 
as part of the claiming decision.  This is, however, no proof that stigma leads to a 
decline.  Given the difficulties to operationalize and isolate the effect of stigmatiza-
tion with respect to the take-up behavior, Currie (2004) even claims that it may 
be impossible to devise a definitive test of the “stigma hypothesis.” While the pres-
ence of the effect of some factors is quite well studied (e. g., the degree of need and 
expected duration of eligibility), whether psychological and social costs should be 
considered as relevant to explain high non-take-up quotas must be clarified further. 
Given this background, this paper follows two main goals.  First, using tax 
data that allows fine-grained non-take-up rates to be estimated regionally, it aims 
to exploit the regional variation in order to study if differing social norms influence 
non-take-up.  As stigmatization occurs as part of social interactions, it can be hy-
pothesized that it must be closely related to social norms.  In a context where norms 
regard social assistance negatively, the fear of stigmatization is increased, whereas in 
areas where norms are more benevolent, take-up of social assistance might be easier. 
Social norms in this study are proxied with parliamentary election results on a com-
munal level.  The social norms thesis is tested against other reasonable explanations 
for differing non-take-up, such as the urban-rural divide, differences in economic 
structure, population density and degree of need.  Second, although non-take-up 
rates may be assumed to be high in Switzerland, the evidence is scarce.  Non-take-
up estimations for Switzerland are absent in recent academic literature, and those 
estimates for Switzerland that do exist are based on survey data with incomplete 
information on the financial situation of potential recipients (e. g., information on 
wealth is missing).  This study, therefore, also aims to compile figures on the preva-
lence of non-take-up in Switzerland using an administrative data approach which 
should lead to a more accurate estimation. 
2 Stigma, welfare attitudes and why norms might affect take-up behavior 
Many scholars who study the effect of stigma incorporate Goffman’s (1963, 6) 
definition of stigma as “the phenomenon whereby an individual with an attribute 
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deeply discredited by his/her society is rejected as a result of the attribute.” While 
stigma is thus described as an attribute of individuals, Goffman also clearly claims 
that the negative connotation of this attribute is constructed on the societal level. 
Accordingly, Link and Phelan (2001) have criticized stigma researchers’ tendency to 
focus too exclusively on the individual level.  Stigma should also be studied as part 
of social labeling.  As norms regarding benefits differ across social groups, it might 
be fruitful to study how social and psychological costs affect take-up behavior in a 
way that pays particular attention to variation of social norms. 
The field of welfare attitude research seems to be a quickly advancing area that 
provides insight on how and to what degree attitudes towards benefit claiming may 
vary (see also Van Oorschot et al. 2017).  Walker et al. (2013), for example, found 
that the shame of poverty and stigma related to social benefits seems to be something 
universal that can be found in many countries, a finding Harrington (1962) already 
pointed to in the 60s.  On a more general level, Staerklé et al. (2012) develop a 
social psychological theory on welfare attitudes, based on the idea that normative 
beliefs are central to maintain social order, and that these beliefs are anchored in 
the everyday experiences of citizens.  To what degree receiving welfare benefits is 
seen as a right or as something shameful is strongly dependent on the moral com-
munities in which individuals are embedded.  Thus, communities are a key factor 
to understand welfare legitimacy.  Using the European Social Survey to study their 
theory in 28 European countries, they show that contextual country features like 
social expenditure and the level of unemployment do indeed shape the perception 
of social risk and welfare legitimacy.  They furthermore conclude that a fruitful 
further step would be to incorporate a measure of the dominant normative context 
or the ideological climate.  “People are likely to be aware of the dominant norms 
prevalent in their societies and disseminated through media and public discourses” 
(Staerklé et al. 2012, 35).  Community-specific norms may prove to be a powerful 
context level influencer on people’s positioning towards welfare attitudes.  Roosma 
et  al. (2016) took up this endeavor and showed that perceived overuse (welfare 
fraud), but also underuse (non-take-up), are both present in Europe and that the 
perception of both varies regionally.  In Southern and Eastern European countries, 
the perception of underuse is strong, while the Anglo-Saxon countries stand out as 
countries with a high average level of suspiciousness as to benefit abuse.3 Because of 
the relative lack of reliable information on the actual non-take-up rate in all studied 
countries, the authors conclude that people do not build their judgment on facts 
about overuse and underuse.  Rather, the perceptions seem to be driven by ideol-
ogy beliefs.  They show that people with right-wing ideology believe that there is 
more welfare fraud as compared to left-wing people.  However, they also observe 
3 For Switzerland, the authors report below average perception of over- and underuse of welfare 
benefits.
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strong contextual level effects.  In countries where public discourse supports strong 
negative images of welfare recipients, the level of perceived welfare abuse is higher. 
Why and to what degree actual take-up and non-take-up of benefits vary regio-
nally is studied less rigorously.  There are studies that report regional differences in 
non-take-up, which indicate that social or psychological costs may vary with the 
context and that contextual factors have a significant impact on take-up behavior. 
Non-take-up studies for Germany, for example, revealed higher non-take-up quotas 
in Eastern Germany than in Western Germany (Kayser and Frick 2000; Riphahn 
2001).  Kayser and Frick (2000) explained the difference because of the history 
of rigid socio-political structures in the former East Germany, where people were 
obliged to work and the social assistance program included punishment for those 
able to work but who did not.  There are also several studies that find a strong urban-
rural divide (Becker and Hauser 2005; Bruckmeier and Wiemers 2012; Riphahn 
2001).  Non-take-up seems to be higher in rural areas because the protective shield 
of anonymity is missing in sparsely populated areas.  The more people know each 
other in a community, the more likely claimants are to be exposed.
While some studies already found regional differences in welfare attitudes 
and take-up behavior, to the best of my knowledge, both aspects have not yet been 
brought together empirically.  The subsequent analysis contributes to the literature 
by testing how stable the link between different proxies for welfare attitudes and 
non-take-up rates are.  It can be hypothesized that social norms with respect to 
 social assistance play a major role in explaining non-take-up.  It seems plausible that 
in a context where people are more benevolent towards social assistance, take-up 
has lower social costs, while in areas with aversion towards social assistance, social 
costs are increased. 
To help the reader to understand the subsequent methodological decisions and 
the following results, the next section provides a short description of the organi zation 
of social assistance in Switzerland, and a summary of previous studies that address 
non-take-up in Switzerland.  The section closes by formulating three hypotheses on 
how norms differ regionally in Switzerland and how that might influence take-up 
behavior. 
3 Social Assistance, non-take-up and normative heterogeneity in Switzerland
In Switzerland, working life risks are covered by three main schemes (Champion 
2011).  The primary mode of offsetting the risks faced by the unemployed is fed-
eral unemployment insurance.  Invalidity insurance provides financial resources 
for those who are not able to work for health-related reasons.  Social assistance is 
the last safety net.  It is designed for individuals who do not reach the minimum 
standard of living on their own and are not covered by other institutions of social 
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security.  Social assistance is claimed by individuals who are long-time unemployed 
and who have exhausted their entitlement to regular unemployment benefits4, as 
well as those who work or receive other social benefits, yet still do not reach the 
minimum standard of living.  The provision of social assistance in Switzerland is 
organized on a subnational level – the cantons – rather than on a national level. 
From an international perspective, it is rather unusual that a national law on so-
cial assistance is lacking, but the Swiss Conference on social assistance – a private 
union of professionals – defined guidelines that have been made binding in many 
cantons through cantonal laws.  While basic concepts on social assistance are very 
similar, cantonal variation does exist.  Cantonal legislation especially differs regard-
ing upstream demand-related benefits that supplement social assistance.  There are 
cantons that provide up to eight instruments parallel to social assistance, such as 
family, ageing and care allowances (BFS 2015).  This cantonal heterogeneity adds 
complexity to studies of social assistance and non-take-up in Switzerland that needs 
to be addressed adequately.  
Because postwar Switzerland experienced a period of near full employment, 
for several decades social assistance played a minor role (Champion 2011).  Only 
with the economic crisis of the 1990s did longtime unemployment become a social 
problem and the societal importance of social assistance grow.  Reliable figures on 
social assistance quotas, however, have only been available on national level since 
2005, when the Federal Statistical Office implemented regular surveys on social 
 assistance.  According to the latest figures in 2016, 273 273 individuals live with the 
help of social assistance, and the national social assistance quota is 3.3%. 
Due to specific data demands, the non-take-up of social assistance is studied 
neither systematically nor on a regular basis.  As in other countries, only fragmented 
findings exist for Switzerland.  Based on 1992 data, Leu et al. (1997) report non-
take-up rates ranging from 45% to 86%, depending on the definition of social 
assistance.  Fluder and Stremlow (1999) report similar non-take-up rates (66%) 
and observe substantial regional differences.  As has been found in other countries, 
non-take-up seems to be lower in urban areas than in rural areas.  Years later, Cret-
taz et al. (2009), on the basis of the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS), found that 
in 2005, a share of 28.2% of the population below the poverty line did not have 
the support of social benefits.  It is unfortunate that more recent estimations are 
lacking, particularly since the public discourse on social assistance recipients has 
recently become harsher in West Europe (Larsen 2008; MacDonald et al. 2014; Sage 
2012), where high levels of social expenditure have come under political pressure 
from neo-liberal movements, and where the shift from social to penal regulation of 
social problems has been clearly evidenced (Wacquant 2009).  As a survey among 
applicants for social assistance showed (Neuenschwander et al. 2012), the alleged 
increase in fraud and the general blaming of recipients in the media affects self 
4 The period of entitlement differs with age and the period of work before being unemployed.
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perception of those in need in a negative way.  A newer non-take-up estimation 
would therefore be of interest.  By consulting official statistics on poverty (SILC), 
Schuwey and Knöpfel (2014) presume that the non-take-up quota in recent years 
must be around 30% to 50%.  However, because information on wealth is missing 
and wealth is an important criterion for eligibility, and because cantonal heteroge-
neity with respect to take-up regulations is high, it is not possible to estimate exact 
non-take-up quotas from the available surveys in Switzerland. 
As Switzerland and most European countries are not homogenous with respect 
to normative ideology, it can be hypothesized that moral communities that are 
decisive for an individual’s behavior are not necessarily only nations. The question 
arises which dimensions are vital to study contextual factors and how normative 
ideology should be measured with sub-state context level analysis.
By studying the political geography in Switzerland, Linder et  al. (2008) 
could show that there are several rather constant cleavages in Switzerland that can 
be referred to as moral communities with shared beliefs on social order.  In line 
with Hermann and Leuthold (2003), they underline the importance of the urban-
rural divide.  People with the same social position vote more social-liberal in a city, 
compared to individuals in the countryside, which tend to favor more conservative 
views.  It, therefore, can be hypothesized: 
H1: The social costs of receiving social benefits are reduced in cities where attitudes  towards 
the welfare state are more liberal than in the countryside.  This is why it is expected that 
non-take-up rates are lower in cities.
A second prevalent cleavage relates to language regions.  Linder et al. (2008) show 
that with respect to welfare politics, the French and the Italian part more often vote 
in line with left politics and the German part tends to be more conservative-right 
wing oriented.  In line with these findings, a second hypothesis for the bilingual 
Canton of Bern can be formulated:
H2: The social costs of receiving social benefits are reduced in French-speaking parts 
where attitudes towards the welfare state are more liberal than in German-speaking 
parts.  That’s why it is expected that the non-take-up rate in the French part is lower.
Empirical studies generally indicate that people with left-wing sympathies are in 
favor of a more generous redistribution (Gelissen 2000; Jaeger 2006) and perceive 
the current access to the welfare state as too strict (Roosma et al. 2016), while right-
wing sympathizers see the welfare state as too generous and tend to favor policies 
which restrict access to benefits.  To pick up these thoughts for the current study, it 
seems to be promising to look at the political milieu of communities, as Switzerland 
is organized in a federal way (nation, cantons and communities), and communities 
are an important point of reference for everyday experiences of individuals.  The 
third hypothesis reads as follows:
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H3: The social costs of receiving social benefits are increased in right-wing oriented com-
munities, compared to more liberal left-wing oriented areas.  That’s why it is expected 
that non-take-up rates are higher in right-wing communities respectively and lower in 
left-wing communities.
4 Data and methods 
4.1 Tax data for Canton of Bern
International studies often emphasize the data-related challenges that complicate 
endeavors to estimate valid non-take-up quotas (Hernanz et al. 2004).  Bargain et  al. 
(2012) attribute the high inter-country variations of non-take-up to measurement 
problems as well.  They identify, for example, large discrepancies between two US 
studies that analyzed non-take-up for the same benefit.  They, therefore, conclude 
that the methodological approach might influence the results.  Non-take-up estima-
tions based on surveys tend to overestimate non-take-up (Blank 1997; Hernanz et al. 
2004), because of missing information on wealth (Becker and Hauser 2005; Whelan 
2010) and error measurement errors in income data (Frick and Groh-Samberg 2007).
This study implements a non-take-up estimation approach based on administra-
tive data by comparing official social assistance statistics to the results of eligibility 
simulations using tax data.  The estimation is conducted using micro tax data for the 
Canton of Bern for the year 2012, which was provided by the cantonal tax agency 
as part of the SNF-project “Inequality of Income and Wealth in Switzerland.”5 At 
the time of the analysis, this was the most recently available tax data.  A consoli-
dated version of tax data has only been available with a lag of up to three years, 
since values might change because of objections or missing documents.  To be able 
to identify income on the household level, it is furthermore needed to link tax 
data with register data on housing, which, because of data quality, has only been 
possible since 2012.  The linkage procedure needs a formal authorization, which 
was received for the current project.  That is why the data used provides detailed 
information on the financial situation of households.6 Most importantly, tax data 
includes valid information on housing and capital wealth, so that eligibility can be 
accurately determined.  Because tax data encompassed nearly the total population 
coverage, it is possible to estimate non-take-up rates for the canton as a whole, as 
well as for each municipality. 
5 http://inequalities.ch/.
6 Households are typically not fully identified in tax data as tax forms do not always represent 
households.  In some situations, several household members fill in their own tax forms, like non-
married couples who live together or when young adults live with their parents (Hümbelin and 
Farys 2016).  A special feature of the Bern tax data from 2012 is that tax subjects’ households 
were determined by linking the tax data to the housing register.
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Since no national law on social assistance exists in Switzerland, cantons main-
tain different schemes, and substantial intra-country heterogeneity exists.  Hence, 
non-take-up estimations have to be carefully tailored to regional conditions.  It, 
therefore, seems appropriate to focus on just one canton.  The Canton of Bern is the 
second most populated canton with 990 000 inhabitants living in 379 communi-
ties (2012).  It covers major urban and rural areas, is bilingual (German/French) 
and varies highly between communities with respect to political party support.  It, 
therefore, seems to be an appropriate canton to study contextual differences. 
4.2 Determining social assistance eligibility 
Eligibility is basically determined by comparing the available economic resources of 
households to the eligibility threshold.  If the financial resources of a given household 
fall below the threshold line, this household is technically entitled to social assistance. 
While in theory, the procedure is quite simple, special rules and data restrictions 
introduce hurdles that need to be overcome in order to attain a sound estimation of 
non-take-up quotas.  For one thing, social assistance is not taxed in Switzerland, so 
income from social assistance is not recorded in tax data.  Hence, this paper imple-
ments a two-step approach to estimate non-take-up quotas.  First, the number of 
eligible individuals is estimated based on tax data.  Then this number is compared 
with official statistics on social assistance beneficiaries.  As both datasets cover the 
full population, it is possible to estimate non-take-up quotas by comparing them. 
The procedure this study uses to determine eligibility is closely tailored to the 
means-testing procedure for the Canton of Bern, which a social assistance office 
would follow (BKSE 2016; SKOS 2016).The check of economic resources includes 
checking the income from employed- and self-employed earnings, and income from 
wealth.  It also checks if households receive health care premium benefits.  This is an 
important issue, as the qualifying procedure in the Canton of Bern is quite gener-
ous.  Roughly 30% of the population qualifies for health care premium benefits. 
Note: The check implemented for health care premium benefits varies according to 
household composition, the region where one lives, and the income level without 
social assistance.  The procedure additionally checks if there are other social security 
benefits, such as regular unemployment benefits, pensions, or benefits for the disa-
bled, which might tip the household income over the eligibility level.  Finally, the 
procedure checks if households possess moveable assets above the allowed exemption 
limits, which means it is tested if individuals hold wealth over 4 000 CHF per adult 
or 2 000 CHF per child and not more than 10 000 CHF per family.
The eligibility level is determined based on the size-specific basic household 
living needs, and is regionally tailored by means of an approximation of the cost of 
housing7 and health care premiums from region to region.  This leads to an eligibil-
7 The procedure implements a threshold for housing varying according to the usual local prices; 
similar to the procedure of a social service (see table A-1 in the appendix). 
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ity threshold of roughly 28 000 CHF annual income for a one-person household, 
while for a couple with two children, the threshold is around 59 710 CHF.  Social 
assistance in the Canton of Bern is further combined with so-called “benefits with 
incentives.” These follow the idea that people will continue to make an effort to earn 
an income independent of social assistance if additional benefits are provided for 
beneficiaries who simultaneously participate in the labor market.  This leads to a de 
facto increase of the eligibility threshold related to income already earned.  Benefits 
with incentives, however, don’t exceed 10 200 CHF per year for households with a 
maximum of 5 persons, and 12 000 CHF for larger households. 
Finally, individuals with an old-age and survivor pension or an invalidity pen-
sion also have the possibility to apply for supplemental benefits outside of social 
assistance.  As these supplemental benefits don’t have to be taxed, it is not possible 
to check them, but since the take-up rate for these benefits is known to be high, 
households with either an old-age and survivor pension or an invalidity pension 
will not be counted as among the eligible population.  The simulated mean-testing 
procedure can be summarized in the formula below:
There are, nevertheless, aspects of the means-testing procedure that cannot be ad-
dressed directly, which is why the following results are still estimations.  First, social 
assistance can be applied for on a monthly basis, but tax data collects information 
annually.  This issue can be addressed to some degree by excluding short-term social 
assistance beneficiaries from the social assistance statistics (see next paragraph).  Fur-
thermore, there are incomes that don’t have to be taxed, yet are still considered in a 
SA Eligibility
BNL HCP HC BI inch h r h r i EI IW
−
+ + + < +
:
: , ,0 +( )+( ) [ ]
+ +
TI h r i T T
h h r h
IPB AND SB OR W
BNL HCP HC
, ,
, ,:1 r i EI IW TI h r i F FBI inc IPB AND SB OR W+ ≥ +( ) [ ]+ +( ){ }, ,
Legend
BNL  = basic needs for living
HCP  = health care premium 
HC  = housing cost
BI  = benefits with incentives
inc  = income (earned income (EI), income from wealth (IW), transfer income(TI)) 
IPB  = individual premium benefits
SB  = supplemental benefits
W  = wealth
h = varies with household size
r = varies with region of living
i = varies with income independent of social assistance
T = True with respect to evaluating eligibility bases on supplemental benefits/wealth
F  = False with respect to evaluating eligibility bases on supplemental benefits/wealth
SA- li i ility
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real-world mean-testing procedure.  This is important for young adults in education 
who receive scholarships, grants or financial support from parents.  It is important 
for retirees as well, as they have means of financial support beyond those previously 
mentioned.  This issue is addressed in this paper by narrowing the population of 
study to the working-age population (25–63/64).  Finally, while the rules on social 
assistance eligibility are very clear, the social assistance offices are encouraged to 
treat cases individually, which may lead to exceptional treatment on a case-by-case 
basis.  This, of course, cannot be modelled.
Based on this procedure, it is estimated that 5.7% of the population between 
the ages of 25 and 63/64 living in Bern would be entitled to receive social assistance. 
4.3 Estimating the non-take-up quota
To estimate the non-take-up quota, the quota of entitled individuals is compared to 
the official social assistance quota.  To make the social assistance quota comparable 
to the results based on tax data, a recalculation is needed – as was carried out by the 
Federal Statistical Office (Braun and Boruvka 2016).  The correction included age-
specific limitations and further excluded individuals with foreign nationalities, who 
may be eligible to apply for social assistance, but may not be obliged – depending 
on residency status – to fill in the same tax forms as Swiss citizens because they are 
taxed at source.  Additionally, beneficiaries with less than four months of support 
from social assistance were excluded (short-term social assistance beneficiaries).
Table 1 shows the quota of eligibility, the corrected social assistance quota 
and the corresponding non-take-up quota.  By following this procedure, this study 
concludes that 26.3% of those who would be entitled to social assistance don’t take 
it.  The baseline estimation is extended with upper and lower bound estimates to get 
a sense of the sensitivity of the estimation to the eligibility simulation.  This includes 
a +/– 5% adjustment of the household-specific eligibility threshold.  As shown in 
the table, the non-take-up quota is relatively stable in response to a lowering of the 
threshold, while the increase of the eligible population is higher when subjected to 
an increase of the threshold.
Table 1 Non-take-up of social assistance for working-age populationa  
in Canton of Bern
Quota of eligible 
(Estimation [min–max]b)
Corrected SA-Quotac Non-Take-Up Quota 
(Estimation [min–max]b)
5.7% 
[5.1%–7.0%]
4.2% 26.3%  
[17.6%–40.0%]
a Estimation includes individuals between the ages of 25 and 63/64.
b Min- and max-scenario refer to eligibility thresholds of minus 5% and plus 5%.
c correction includes the exclusion of individuals below 25, individuals in the age of retirement, foreign nationals that are not 
part of the common taxing procedure and short time beneficiaries ( < 4 months).
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5 Regional differences of non-take-up and possible explanations
As shown, social assistance does not reach every member of the target population. 
To explore regional variation within the Canton of Bern, in a next analytical step, 
communal non-take up quotas were calculated by calculating the proportion of the 
eligible population out of tax data subtracted by the official number of beneficiaries 
for each community.  Since the eligibility simulations induce some inaccuracy by 
implementing generalized assumptions, the level of the communal estimates should 
Table 2 Operationalization and descriptive statistics of variables used to 
analyze regional variation (n = 312)
Variable Operationalization Descriptives
Urban/rural Typology of communities according to the 
 Federal Statistical Officea
Cities: 7 (2.3%)
Agglomeration: 74 (23.7%)
Rural com: 231 (74.0%)
Language region Typology of communities according to 
 assignment of the Federal Statistical Office
German: 280 (89.7%)
French: 32 (10.2%)
Left-right-scale (cont.) Voter-shares of Swiss People‘s Party minus 
 Voter-shares of Social Democratic Party. 
 Parliamentary vote 2011
25%-percentile: 11.6
50%-percentile: 22.4
75%-percentile: 34.0
Left-right-scale (cat.) Categories are built based on 25 and 
75  percentiles 
Cat1: middle-left wing: 78 (25.0%)
Cat2: moderate middle: 165 (52.9%)
Cat3: right-wing: 69 (22.1%)
% empl. in sec. 1 Employees in primary economic sector 25%-percentile: 0.2
50%-percentile: 16.3
75%-percentile: 72.8
% empl. in sec. 2 Employees in secondary economic sector 25%-percentile: 14.8
50%-percentile: 23.4
75%-percentile: 34.2
% empl. in sec. 3 Employees in tertiary economic sector 25%-percentile: 13.3
50%-percentile: 50.0
75%-percentile: 65.4
Population density Population per km2 25%-percentile: 68.9
50%-percentile: 135.4
75%-percentile: 301.1
% working poor Share of persons with at least one entry of 
earned income over a year among eligible 
 households of a community
25%-percentile: 53.3
50%-percentile: 64.0
75%-percentile: 73.1
Average gap to 
 eligibility threshold
Average gap to eligibility threshold in CHF 
of annual income among eligible house-
holds of a community
25%-percentile: 4 503
50%-percentile: 18 008
75%-percentile: 21 577
a The original categories “isolated cities” and “core city of an agglomeration” were put together to the category “cities.”
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be interpreted with care.  This is especially true for small communities where small 
deviations already lead to inaccurate estimations.  Therefore, communities are 
 excluded from further analyses that reach – based on the communal distribution of 
non-take-up quotas – below or beyond the 5% and 95% percentile, respectively (see 
figure A-1 and A-2 in the appendix for boxplots with and without outliers).  This 
leaves a sample of 312 communities with an average non-take-up quota of 41.1% 
and a standard deviation of 31.4%. 
To analyze regional non-take up within the Canton of Bern, the tax data based 
information were matched to key figures for Swiss communities for the year 2012 
that are made publicly available through the Federal Statistical Office (BFS 2013). 
Table 2 lists the variables used for regression analysis later on.  It describes how 
they are operationalized and provides descriptive information on the communities 
in the Canton of Bern.  In 2012, seven communities qualified as cities.  74 (24%) 
are classified as being part of the agglomeration, and the majority (74%) are rural 
communities.  The canton is mainly German-speaking (90% of the communities) 
with a French-speaking part (10%).  The working population is strongly engaged 
in the service sector (the median share of employees in the tertiary sector in a com-
munity is 50%), while industrial (23%) and agricultural (23%) labor are still present. 
5.1 Differences between urban and rural, language region and along  
political  orientation
The descriptive analysis shows results which suggest that social costs related to 
 social norms indeed might influence non-take-up as stated in the three formulated 
 hypotheses.  First, there is a gap between the German and the French region.  On 
average, non-take up is higher in the German region (median non-take-up = 45.6%) 
than in the French (median non-take-up = 16.2%).  This might be due to different 
perceptions of claiming social benefits which can be associated with differing social 
costs as stated in hypothesis 1.  Second, non-take-up is on average lower in cities 
(median non-take-up = 12.2%) than in agglomerations (median non-take-up = 28.2%) 
and rural communities (median non-take-up = 50.0%), as was visible in previous 
studies.  Often, it is argued that population density is a key factor for explaining 
the urban-rural divide.  In small communities, beneficiaries can be easily identi-
fied, possibly making them an easier target for stigmatization than social  assistance 
recipients in densely populated cities which grant greater anonymity.  Besides the 
mere fact of the population density, however, there are other social costs related to 
the stigma that may explain the rural-urban divide; namely, social costs related to 
differing norms regarding social assistance.  It is said that the population in cities is 
more socially liberal, which leads to higher take-up rates than in rural areas, where 
the milieu is more conservative and the dislike of social assistance is greater, thus 
leading to higher non-take-up rates as is stated in hypothesis 2. 
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When it comes to the measurement question, it has to be stated that there is no 
survey in Switzerland where it is possible to directly aggregate welfare attitudes on 
a communal level to build contextual-level factors.  As outlined in the theoretical 
section, it calls for looking at political orientation instead.  With respect to this, the 
outcome of parliamentary votes seems to be a plausible way to measure if people 
in a region rather favor left-wing oriented than right-wing oriented politics which 
stand for a favorable respectively harsh milieu with respect to claiming social ben-
efits.  Parliamentary votes are held every four years, are publicly available and can 
easily be matched to the communities.  Fivaz (2015) shows that party profiles in 
Switzerland with respect to social assistance are quite heterogeneous, with a strong 
Figure 1 Non-take-up quotas of municipalities of the Canton of Bern along  
a left-right political scale
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Remarks:
Circles are drawn in relation to population size.
Left-right-scale = voters share Swiss People’s Party minus Social Democratic Party (parliamentary elections, 2011).
The line visualizes the (linear) correlation between the left-right scale and the non-take-up quotas.
Angeboten von  Fachhochschule Bern | Heruntergeladen  20.12.19 18:04  UTC
Non-Take-Up of Social Assistance: Regional Differences and the Role of Social Norms 21
SJS 45 (1), 2019, 7–33
left-right divide.  The Social Democratic Party (SDP), which traditionally stands for 
more equality and combatting poverty, is strongly in favor of maintaining generous 
social assistance benefits.  The other end of the left-right pole is held by the Swiss 
People’s Party (SPP), for whom the reduction of social assistance benefits is a promi-
nent issue on the agenda.  The SPP was able to expand their voter base in the years 
after 2000 and are currently the strongest party in Switzerland, while the SDP lost 
voters but remain the second strongest party (Rennwald and Zimmermann 2016). 
To study to what degree non-take up rates vary with respect to political orienta-
tion, a left-right scale based on the parliamentary outcome of 2011 was calculated 
by subtracting the SDP-voters’ share (left wing) from the SPP-voters’ share (right 
wing).8 This results in a scale that measures if people in a community favor left or 
right wing politics or if political forces are rather balanced.  As seen in Table 2, the 
median value of +22 indicates that in an average community in Bern, the share of 
the right-wing (SDP) outnumbers the share of the left-wing (SPP) voters.  Still there 
are some communities where the left-wing party dominates.
Figure 1 displays the communities of the Canton of Bern in a scatterplot with 
non-take-up quotas on the y-axis and a left-right-scale, based on the parliamentary 
vote, on the x-axis.  As seen in the figure, cities are, on average, more left-oriented 
than agglomerations that take on more balanced values on the left-right scale.  In 
rural communities, there is quite some variation.  There are rural municipalities 
that are similar to cities in regard to their political orientation, while there are also 
municipalities that are very conservative.  As is clearly visible, the scatterplot suggests 
that there is a relationship between social norms – represented as vote share – and 
non-take-up quotas, and this relationship is strongly driven by the rural communi-
ties (see also box-plots in figures A-1 and A-2 in the appendix).
This bivariate analysis hints in the direction of the formulated hypotheses.  As 
outlined already in the theoretical section, there is an empirical overlap with respect 
to the dominant language/urbanity of a region and political orientation.  In a next 
step, with the help of regression analysis, it is determined if the degree of urbanity, 
language region and political orientation point to different facets of social norms 
which influence non-take up, or if one measure dominates the others.  By analyzing 
the variance inflation factor, it is furthermore possible to determine if multicollin-
earity between these three concepts reaches critical values, or if the variation in the 
data including all three variables is sufficient to estimate separate effects.
8 An alternative operationalization including parties like the Free Democratic Party or the Greens 
Party was tested.  The index correlated strongly with the simple form of the left-right scale 
(r = 0.97), but model fit in the later regression analysis was lower.  Because of that and for easier 
interpretation, the simpler form of the left right scale was used.
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5.2 How might differences be explained?
The descriptive results suggest that differing social norms do indeed influence the 
non-take-up rate.  But do these results hold if other relevant factors are controlled 
for?  The population density thesis is closely related, albeit with other social mecha-
nisms.  This thesis also states that non-take-up is influenced by stigma, but that 
the urban-rural divide is instead explained by differing population density, i. e. by 
exposure in rural areas and anonymity in urban areas.  There are also three strong 
economic arguments that might explain the urban/rural divide and that might dis-
solve the descriptive association.  First, the take-up rate in rural areas might be lower 
because other means of support exist in rural areas.  In smaller rural communities, 
people traditionally rely more heavily on private support and helping each other out 
(Fluder and Stremlow 1999).  Furthermore, if households maintain farms or large 
gardens, they also have the option to live self-sufficiently (Contzen 2015).  Second, 
as farmers fear that they will have to sell their farm if they apply for social assistance, 
it can be hypothesized that this explains low take-up rates in rural areas that rely on 
farming.  Third, the thesis that economic structure influences non-take-up can be 
developed further to encompass not only the agricultural/primary sector, but the 
industrial/secondary and the service/tertiary sectors as well.  The economic structure 
influences employment opportunities, and it might therefore influence the expected 
duration of being in need (Bruckmeier and Wiemers 2012).  People working in 
the dynamic tertiary economic sector are more likely to be working poor.  This, 
for example, is true for people working in gastronomy.  At the same time, people 
working in a tertiary sector job can expect to be back in the labor market sooner, 
because developments are more dynamic and the sector is the largest job provider. 
Both dynamics boost non-take-up.  In contrast, the importance of the secondary 
economic sector continues to decrease, and expectations for its future are rather 
pessimistic.  Correspondingly, if people in industrial areas are in need, they may 
fear having to remain in this situation for longer periods.  This mechanism boosts 
take-up and decreases non-take-up. 
As the economic structure and population density in urban and rural areas 
are very different, it is possible that the urban/rural divide is driven by these factors 
and not by differing social norms. 
To test these arguments, several regression models were calculated (see Table 3). 
Model 1 replicates the descriptively observed differences between urban and rural 
areas.  Expected non-take-up quotas are higher on average in rural municipalities 
(+18.3) than in cities, while the difference between cities and agglomerations are 
marginal.  There are also differences with respect to language regions.  Non-take-up 
is lower in the French-speaking region (–25.3).  This simple model already explains 
10.3% of regional variance.  While these differences could be due to differing so-
cial norms, more light is shed on the ongoing mechanism by introducing variables 
 according to described alternative explanations.  If the model is supplemented with 
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the left-right-scale variable, as a more direct proxy for differing social norms, the 
variance explained is nearly doubled and the effect is stronger than the effects of the 
mere urban/rural variable and the dummy for the language region.  Indeed, their 
direct effects decrease substantially, so that they no longer statistically significant differ 
from zero.  The interpretation thereof could be that most of the difference between 
Table 3 Effect estimation for communal non-take-up quotas (OLS)
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Urban/rural (ref.: cities)
agglomerations 3.87
(3.51)
2.64 
(3.25)
0.97 
(3.46)
–1.42 
(3.34)
4.03 
(3.23)
rural communities 18.3***
(3.62)
1.30 
(4.29)
–5.73
(5.60)
–7.60
(5.42)
–8.64
(4.84)
Language region: 
(ref.: German) 
French –25.3***
(6.65)
–9.90
(6.59)
–3.04
(6.12)
1.81
(5.93)
–14.4**
(5.23)
Left–right orientation 
(ref.: moderate)
middle–left –19.0***
(4.23)
–12.6**
(4.17)
–11.3**
(4.01)
–8.14*
(3.40)
right–conservative 30.3***
(6.56)
16.3*
(6.40)
19.4**
(6.16)
12.25*
(5.40)
Economic structure
% empl. in sec. 1 
(ref.: sec 2)
0.69***
(0.15)
0.49**
(0.15)
0.38**
(0.10)
% empl. in sec. 3 
(ref.: sec 2)
0.76***
(0.10)
0.64***
(0.10)
0.36***
(0.10)
log (population density) –7.93***
(1.87)
–6.57***
(1.81)
–8.85***
(1.56)
% working poor 0.39***
(0.11)
0.31**
(0.10)
log (average gap to eligibility 
threshold)
–18.6***
(5.45)
–20.8***
(4.7)
Intercept 21.3***
(2.68)
40.3***
(4.90)
31.8*
(15.8)
193.4***
(56.5)
248.67***
(56.4)
n (municipalities) 312 312 312 312 312
r2 0.103 0.242 0.393 0.446 0.407
adjusted R2 0.094 0.229 0.377 0.428 0.388
method OLS OLS OLS OLS MM–95
municipalities with |weights| 
( < 0.00032)
2
municipalities with 
weights < 1
85
Remarks: Significance levels: ***p ≤ 0, **p ≤ 0.001, *p ≤ 0.01, p ≤ 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses. All estimations apply 
analytical weights based on population of communities. OLS: Ordinary least square. MM-95: Robust estimation using a MM-
Type estimation (Koller and Stahel 2011). Estimation results in robust and efficient estimations with 50% breaking points and 
95% asymptotic efficient normally distributed standard error (Rousseeuw et al. 2015).
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urban and rural areas and between language regions is captured by the theoretically 
more direct operationalization of social norms through political orientation.  Model 3 
adds additional control variables like economic structure (share of employees in the 
respective economic sector) and the log of the population density.  Again, the model 
fit increases substantially.  Model 3 explains 39.3% of regional variance.  The effect 
coefficients show that an increasing share of employees in the primary and the tertiary 
sector is associated with an expected increase of non-take-up.  The effects also show 
that industrial areas seem to have lower non-take-up rates.  This is in line with the 
fact that the industrial economies in the Canton of Bern are located in the French 
part, and controlling for this further dissolves the effect of the language dummy. 
This result supports the thesis of effects stemming from employment opportunities 
related to economic structure, and it can also be interpreted as supporting additional 
options to live self-sufficiently by means of farming.  While Model 3, moreover, shows 
a strong negative effect of the logarithmic population density, further analyses not 
displayed here show that this effect is strongly driven by the difference between small 
to average municipalities and flattens out when comparing average municipalities to 
cities.  It seems, therefore, that population density influences the take-up behavior, 
especially in small communities, where it is potentially possible that social assistance 
applicants and employees of the social service agency know each other.  Model 4 is 
finally extended with variables derived directly from tax data.  Both variables describe 
the degree of need and show effects in the expected way with plausible sizes.  The 
effect of “% working poor” can be interpreted directly: if the share of working poor 
among the group of eligible households increases, for example, by 10 percentage 
points, the expected share of non-take up increases by 4 percentage points.  The 
effect of the average gap to the eligible threshold is of similar size.  Because of the 
logarithmic scale the effect-coefficient divided by 100 approximates the effect of a 
one percent change on non-take up rates of communities.  An average gap measure 
by annual income increases by 10% results in 10*(–18.6/100) = –1.86 percent point 
decrease of the expected non-take up rate.
Note that the effect related to the left-right scale decreased when implement-
ing key economic explanatory variables and population density, but that the effect 
that remains is still statistically different from zero. 
From a methodical perspective, two issues need to be clarified further.  First, 
as the sample size is relatively small, it may be of interest if and to what degree the 
results are driven by single observations which are different compared to the oth-
ers (outliers).  Second, to what degree is collinearity present between the variables 
used in the model, and do they lead to critical multicollinearity that hinders the 
interpretation of single estimates?  The robustness analysis described below focuses 
on how the effect of political orientation changes.
A first visual inspection of the residuals and partial leverage plots do indeed 
show some anomalies.  One observation deviates especially strong from the others. 
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Further inspections show that it is one of the large cities, indicating that the ongoing 
mechanisms are somehow different in the large city.  Excluding this single observa-
tion leads to a small decrease of the effects of political orientation (left-middle from 
–11.3** to –10.4** and right-wing: 19.4** to 18.8**), but not in a substantial way. 
More automated possibilities to check the robustness of regression models offer 
methods of robust regression (Jann 2010).  Methods that are part of robust regression 
methodology are less influenced by outliers and possess desired features even if the 
distribution of residuals is not normal.  They are, therefore, able to uncover basic 
associations in the data even when outliers are present.  Results in Table 3 below the 
column of Model 5 implemented a robust regression of the MM-type.  MM-type 
robust regressions try to balance the effective contribution of single observations by 
giving deviating observations less weight.  The implemented estimation procedure 
uses 50% breaking points and 95% asymptotic normal efficiency standard errors. 
These are the parameters recommended by Koller and Stahel (2011) and Rousseeuw 
et al. (2015), and the robust regression method does indeed lead to the exclusion of 
two observations, the reweighting of 85 observations and a slightly reduced model fit.
The effect of the social norms variable is reduced as well, but it is statistically 
still significantly different from zero.  All other effects are rather constant, except for 
the effect related to the language dummy.  This can be interpreted as signifying that 
there might still be an effect of social norms related to cultural differences.  Further 
research should investigate this possibility more deeply. 
Further robustness checks were done to investigate how the correlation between 
the independent variables influences stability of effect coefficients and if they inflate 
standard errors.9 Variance inflation factors (VIF) can be calculated to check for the 
degree of multicollinearity.  A variable whose VIF value is greater than 10 may merit 
further investigation (UCLA 2018).  Based on Model (4), none of the VIF values 
exceed 5.0.10  The highest VIF values occur for population density and the urban/
rural-variable.  Excluding either population density or the urban/rural variable 
does not influence the effect of political orientation estimates strongly (middle-left: 
–14.5***/–10.2***, right-wing: 23.6***/20.4***).  A further robustness check was 
performed by excluding both variables.  Mean VIF of this model falls below 2 with 
a value of 1.83.  While the variables contain information on employees in primary 
(VIF = 3.2) and tertiary sector (VIF = 2.4) are still above two, this is not a problem 
at all, as these variables are by definition correlated.  Coefficients for political orien-
tation look as follows: –14.6*** middle/left, +23.3*** right-wing.  Further models 
were estimated with MM-95 robust regressions.  For this model, VIF was high 
again for the variables for economic structure and the left-right scale.  A final model 
9 Calculating a rank correlation matrix with all independent variables indicates correlation above 
|0.5| between urban/rural and population density (–0.6), urban/rural and employees in primary 
sector (0.5), political orientation and employees in primary sector (–0.7), population density and 
employees in primary sector (–0.7).
10 See table A-2 in the appendix.
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with robust regression and only the variables language region, left-right, working 
poor and poverty gap resulted in a model with VIF values below 1.5 for all vari-
ables, an adjusted R-square of 0.31, the exclusion of two cases and a reweighting of 
140 observations with weights lower than 0.95.  The effect for political orientation 
remained stable: middle/left: –13.2***, right-wing: +24.5.
A summary of the robustness analysis might help to orientate: different models 
were calculated to check the stability of the effects related to political orientation. 
The robustness check, however showed that there are cases that deviate from the 
general pattern and there is also collinearity to some degree.  It has to be noted that 
there are no strict rules on how deviating observations and multicollinearity should 
be treated.  A single “true” model can, therefore, not be determined.  However, over 
all the tested variants, the effect of political orientation remains in the theoretical 
expected way, reaching from middle/left: –8.1*, right-wing: 12.2* for Model (5) 
all variables used, some collinearity accepted, deviant observations weighted down 
to middle/left: –13.2***, right-wing: +24.5 indicating that  – given the data at 
hand – a substantially rather strong effect relating to political orientation of com-
munities, which is a plausible proxy for attitudes toward social assistance benefits 
can be identified.  
6 Discussion and conclusion
While most Western societies provide social assistance for households that lack the 
resources to maintain a minimum standard of living, non-take-up quotas in many 
countries are high.  This raises questions about the causes of this phenomenon, and 
about whether or not the design of the welfare system is adequate to reach the target 
group.  Other studies have already shown that economic contingencies, like the 
degree of need and the expected duration of being supported by social assistance, 
are important factors for the non-take-up of social assistance.  Even though it seems 
common knowledge that social assistance is indeed associated with a stigma in many 
countries; however, whether the social costs associated with social norms also explain 
take-up behavior remains a subject of controversy.
The present study contributes to this debate by analyzing regional differences 
of non-take-up and the role of differing social norms by estimating communal non-
take-up quotas for the Canton of Bern in Switzerland.  These estimations are based 
on a comparison of eligibility simulations, based on tax data with official statistics 
on the beneficiaries of social assistance.  The descriptive part of this article showed 
that there are indeed differences along known cleavages within Switzerland that sup-
port this view.  Non-take up is lower in urban areas than in rural.  It is also lower 
in the French-speaking part compared to the German-speaking part.  This indicates 
that these divisions might reflect different perceptions of the legitimacy of welfare 
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receipt that might induce different social costs with respect to claiming benefits.  The 
empirical part further showed that social norms are proxied more directly through 
political orientation, measured as results from parliamentary votes.  If the popula-
tion of a region prefers parties promoting the reduction of social assistance, it is 
assumed that social costs for persons to apply for social assistance must be higher. 
Likewise, it is assumed that in regions where a larger share of the vote supports 
parties in favor of politics for poor, the social costs to apply for social assistance are 
lower.  The descriptive results show a strong correlation for municipalities situated 
on a vote-based left-right-scale with non-take-up quotas.  On the one hand, this 
overlaps with the urban-rural divide, but on the other, it is strongly driven by rural 
municipalities that are very heterogeneous in their political leanings.  The correlation 
shows that non-take-up rises if the political milieu becomes more conservative.  This 
descriptive result has been tested against a set of alternative economic explanations 
with multiple regression models which were extended with robustness checks for 
reasons of sensitivity.  While alternative explanations also hold, the effects related 
to social norms remain.  This supports the thesis that non-take-up is influenced by 
social norms.
The second objective of the study was to provide a current and accurate figure 
on the prevalence of non-take-up in Switzerland. With respect to this the study 
presents a first administrative data based estimations for Switzerland.  The estimated 
non-take-up quota is a bit lower than presumed by Schuwey and Knöpfel (2014), 
who estimated that in Switzerland, it must be around 30% to 50% by consulting 
official poverty statistics.  On the one hand, this discrepancy could be due to the 
accuracy gained by using administrative data (having access to information on 
wealth), while on the other hand, it is not possible to cover the complete foreign 
population with tax data, because they get taxed differently in the first period after 
immigration – which might influence non-take-up estimation.  Bruckmeier and 
Wiemers (2012), for example, showed that foreigners have a lower probability of 
taking up social assistance benefits, because they are less familiar with the welfare 
system than  native citizens and because they tend to get more stigmatized.  There are 
also legal reasons why foreigners tend to forego social assistance.  Since the receipt 
of social benefits is included in the examination of the settlement permit.  It might, 
therefore, be hypothesized that the non-take-up quota might be even higher if all 
categories of foreigners could be included.
Besides the fact that this study is not able to address the situation of non-
take-up for specific categories of foreigners, there are other drawbacks that might be 
addressed in a follow-up study.  With the approach chosen, it is, for example, not 
possible to distinguish between the persistent and the temporary form of non-take-
up (Bruckmeier and Wiemers 2012).  A combination of episodic earned income 
data combined with episodic data on social benefits and on wealth would make 
that possible, and it would further increase the accuracy of non-take-up estimates. 
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Furthermore, the study excluded young adults and pensioners as their financial situ-
ation is covered by other instruments, like scholarships and supplementary benefits, 
which are not covered in the data this study used.  However, from a theoretical 
perspective, it would be of interest to know more about the take-up behavior along 
the life course and also between age cohorts.
From a substantial point of view, a further limitation of the study is that it 
remains unclear how different regional norms translate to actual behavior.  As the 
social services are organized on the communal level, this might be a result of different 
administrative setups that hamper or facilitate the take up of social assistance.  It 
could also be the result of a reasoned decision of individuals.  It is plausible that the 
fear of stigmatization leads to increased social costs and that this process reduces the 
willingness to take up social benefits.  Furthermore, Warin (2016) points out that 
not taking up social benefits, in the case that the person in question is completely 
aware of its possibilities, also refers to an act of disagreement between the user and 
the rights granted that fundamentally questions the given social policy.  In this vein, 
Leresche and Tabin (2016) point out that non-take-up can be an expression of an 
autonomous act of social criticism that opens up the field for alternative forms of 
support, such as private social services, soup kitchens, exchange platform for objects 
and services or occupying vacant apartments, which must be respected (Tabin and 
Leresche 2016).  All these three possible interpretations of how social norms influ-
ence behavior are in line with the given results.  Additional research is needed to 
further clarify how different social milieus and norms relate to take up behavior.
Compared to other countries, the non-take-up quota of the present study 
is rather low (Hernanz et al. 2004).  This might be explained by the professional 
structures in Switzerland that lead to comparably better coverage with social as-
sistance.  Nonetheless, non-take-up is present in Switzerland as well.  It can be 
assumed that it is especially present if individuals earn some income and if they are 
around the threshold for the minimum standard of living.  As the threshold varies 
by household size, regions of living and other income sources, it is difficult for those 
affected to determine on their own if they qualify for social assistance.  Some will 
contact a social security office to clarify their situation.  Others, however, will try to 
live with scarce financial resources, ask for support in their social environment, get 
into debt and even renounce claiming health support if it is not immediately vital 
(Bodenmann et al. 2014).  More generally, they miss the opportunity for a profes-
sional consultation on how to improve their situation.  Non-take-up is neither only 
a private matter only, nor merely a question of injustice, as the debts and precari-
ous existences of individuals can increase long-term costs for society.  This might 
include expensive debt restructuring or costs related to long-term health problems 
(Knüsel and Colombo 2014).  Furthermore, if children live in the household, the 
risk of passing on poverty to them is increased because worrying how to master 
the episode of financial hardship might suppress other family ambitions and thus, 
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investment in the education of their children may no longer be the first priority. 
It is therefore questionable if social costs and stigmatization are adequate pillars of 
efficient poverty policies.
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8 Appendix
Table A1 Rental index for MS regions in the Canton of Bern
MS-Region Rental index
Aaretal 105.61
Bern 119.80
Biel/Bienne 97.96
Burgdorf 99.08
Erlach-Seeland 101.53
Grenchen 87.45
Jura bernois 76.02
Kandertal 87.35
La Chaux-de-Fonds 78.16
Murten/Morat 108.27
Oberaargau 91.84
Oberes Emmental 93.16
Oberland-Ost 112.45
Saanen-Obersimmental 140.20
Schwarzwasser 91.94
Thun 109.18
Quelle: Own calculations based on the offer prices of rented apartments according to MS-regions, Wüest & Partner, Immo-
Monitoring.
Table A2 VIF values
Variable VIF(df)
urban/rural 4.6(2)
language region 1.4(1)
left/right 2.9(2)
employees in primary sector 3.4(1)
employees in tertiary sector 2.9(1)
population density 5.0(1)
% working poor 1.2(1)
log (poverty gap) 1.6(1)
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Figure A-2 Non-take-up quotas of municipalities of the Canton of Bern for 
 different types of municipalities (without outliers)
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Note: Outliers were eliminated if they exceeded 5% and 95% percentiles values.
Figure A-1 Non-take-up quotas of municipalities of the Canton of Bern for 
 different types of municipalities (with outliers)
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Note: Two cases with strong negative values were excluded for this visual representation because the graph would no longer 
be sufficiently legible for the relevant area. It could not be determined why these implausible cases with large negative values 
occurred. 
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